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TOWARD A RELIGIOUS MINORITY VOICE: A LOOK AT
FREE EXERCISE LAW THROUGH A RELIGIOUS MINORITY
PERSPECTIVE
Samuel J. Levine*
Legal scholars have recently advanced theories emphasizing the impor-
tance of perspectives in the law. Perspective scholarship recognizes that
laws are necessarily shaped by society's dominant forces, including its bias-
es and preconceptions. Perspective scholars attempt to understand how
these forces have shaped our laws, and they suggest changes to accommo-
date those affected by society's biases.
In this Article, Professor Levine introduces the concept of a religious
minority perspective. He develops the concept of a religious minority per-
spective in the context of several, prominent Free Exercise cases. Professor
Levine discusses these cases in his presentation of the central themes of a
religious minority perspective, as he illuminates perspective theory in gener-
al.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a vast area of scholarship has emerged discussing the
importance of "perspectives" in legal thinking and education.' Legal theo-
Assistant Legal Writing Professor, St. John's University School of Law; B.A.,
Yeshiva University, 1990; J.D., Fordham University, 1994; Ordination, Yeshiva Univer-
sity, 1996; LL.M., Columbia University, 1996.
An earlier draft of this Article was written for Columbia Law School's Graduate
Seminar in Legal Education. I thank the seminar instructors, Peter Strauss and Mary
Zulack, as well as seminar participants Kathy Cerminara, Jennifer Elrod and Christine
Farley for their helpful comments and general encouragement. I also thank Patricia Wil-
liams and Eugene Volokh for helpful discussions and Kent Greenawalt and Nathan
Lewin for their thoughtful analysis of many of these cases.
1 For a helpful description of perspective scholarship, see Martha Albertson
Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law: The Difference It Makes, 2 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
1, 10 (1992):
The term perspective scholarship encompasses an ever-growing body of work
connected by the fact that it challenges the traditional notion that law is a neutral,
objective, rational set of rules, unaffected in content and form by the passions and
perspectives of those who possess and wield the power inherent in law and legal
institutions.
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rists have begun to recognize that because law does not develop independent
of societal forces and prejudices, the law will, to varying degrees, reflect
some of those forces and prejudices.
Some proponents of viewing the law through different perspectives have
developed new disciplines of legal study, such as critical legal studies, femi-
nist jurisprudence, and critical race theory. Scholarship in these areas is
largely premised on the assertion that the law as it now stands is a construct
of the dominant forces in society and that the law has been written by judg-
es and legislators who, consciously or not, have shared the biases of society
at large.2 If these premises are true, according to some theorists, it follows
that the law must be deconstructed and reformulated in a manner that takes
into account perspectives that have been excluded.3 In addition, a number of
scholars have asserted that an effective way to understand the biases inher-
ent in the law is to read the narratives of those groups that are disadvan-
taged as a result of these prejudices.
A central goal of perspective scholarship is to express the notion that
because law is a reflection of broader sociological issues, these issues are by
definition a part of the law.4 The sociological issues themselves can be
properly understood only through the different perspectives of those who are
affected in unique ways by sociological forces. Therefore, it follows that in
order to properly understand the law, scholars must understand various per-
2 See id. at 11 ("Perspective scholarship is based on the premise that certain groups
historically have been unrepresented in law and their exclusion has led to biases-an
incompleteness or deficit in contemporary legal analysis and institutions.").
3 As Professor Fineman notes, "perspective scholars argue the corresponding con-
tention that historically excluded groups have different, perhaps unique, views and expe-
riences that are relevant to the issues and circumstances regulated and controlled by
law." Id.
Mari Matsuda similarly describes an "outsider's jurisprudence," characterized by a
methodology "grounded in ... social reality and experience ... which rejects
presentist, androcentric, Eurocentric, and false-universalist descriptions of social phe-
nomena." Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2323-24 (1989).
4
[Perspective scholars] look to the social, cultural, and political, in addition to the
legal, to provide a context for understanding the operation and impact of law in
our society. The perspective scholar's definition of "law" is broad .... Law is
not only something "out there"--an independent body of principles-but a prod-
uct of society, acted upon and responsive to political and cultural forces. For this
reason, it is as essential to understand societal and cultural forces as it is to deci-
pher doctrine in order to understand "the law." . . . [Perspective scholarship]
makes more complete and more complex our consideration of the questions "what
is law?" and "what are the roles and functions of law in our society?"
Fineman, supra note 1, at 11.
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spectives.
This Article considers yet another voice in legal analysis, a religious
minority perspective. A religious minority perspective not only provides a
unique viewpoint but also helps illuminate other perspectives. This Article
examines the religious minority perspective through a discussion of major
issues in current free exercise jurisprudence. In so doing, this Article' offers
a further illustration of the effect of perspectives on the law and the impor-
tance of perspectives in legal thinking.
I. PERSPECTIVES AND "THE LAW"
Some scholars argue that the use of perspectives is merely an attempt to
bring unrelated and highly irrelevant disciplines, such as sociology, into the
arena of legal analysis. As Cass Sunstein noted, however, "the judgments of
victims (or of any other particular group) cannot by themselves be decisive.
But they are highly relevant. In a system of free expression, exposure to
multiple perspectives will offer a fuller picture of the consequences of social
acts. This should help make for better law."5
Professor Sunstein observes that the perspectives of particular groups,
such as victims, are "highly relevant."6 Feminist theorists and critical race
theorists, among others, have demonstrated that the perspectives of
underrepresented groups, especially of those groups victimized by legal
constructs, are highly relevant but have been ignored.7 Religious minorities
who are victims of laws restricting their free exercise rights can make a
similar claim. Indeed, Martha Fineman has included religion among the
"diverse and often divergent viewpoints based on ... social and cultural
experiences" introduced into legal discourse by perspective jurisprudence!
Sunstein similarly advocates exposure to "multiple perspectives" to provide
a more complete picture of the consequences of acts within society. More-
over, as Sunstein notes, an increased understanding of society through per-
spectives "should help make for better law."9
Ironically, Sunstein has been criticized for not sufficiently taking per-
spectives into account in free speech law. Jack Balkin contends that
Sunstein's writings reflect academics' failure to recognize "their status as
members of a subculture whose elite values tend to shape and occasionally
distort their perspectives."1 Professor Balkin makes a convincing argument
5 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 243 (1993).
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Fineman, supra note 1, at 11. Professor Fineman also lists other viewpoints, in-
cluding race, gender, class, and sexual orientation.
9 SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 243.
10 J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 YALE
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for the value of perspectives:
If critical race theory and feminism have taught us anything,
it is that one cannot begin to understand the situation of
others until one also understands one's differences from
them and how this difference affects one's ways of seeing
the world. If we do not investigate the relationship between
our social situation and our perspectives, we may confuse
our conception of what is reasonable with Reason itself. If
we do not see how our reason is both enabled and limited by
our position, we may think our judgments positionless and
universal. We may find the perspectives of those differently
situated unreasonable, bizarre, and even dangerous, or we
may not even recognize the possibility of another way of
looking at things."
Balkin does not limit his argument to critical race theory or feminist
theory. Extending his logic to the social and cultural status of academia,
Balkin concludes that
[w]hat is true of race and gender is also true of professional
training and social position. If legal academics are to learn
something from populism, they must first try to understand
the professional perspective from which they offer their
judgments and the kinds of rhetoric they use to offer
them. 2
Similarly, one can apply the same rationale to acknowledge that we form
our judgments on religious matters based largely on our own religious per-
spectives.
Though Balkin calls on legal academics to recognize their own perspec-
tives, the same suggestion can be addressed to the entire legal community,
and most importantly to judges. 3 In light of subsequent appreciation for
L.J. 1935, 1990 (1995) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM
OF FREE SPEECH (1993)).
11 Id. at 1952.
12 Id.
" Criticizing Ronald Dworkin's "conception of law," Frank Michelman wrote:
What is lacking is dialogue. Hercules, Dworkin's mythic judge, is a loner ....
His narrative constructions are monologues. He converses with no one, except
through books. He has no encounters. He meets no otherness .... No interlocutor
violates the inevitable insularity of his experience and outlook. Hercules is just a
156 [Vol. 5:1
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the perspectives of various minority views, numerous judicial decisions
appear not only wrongly decided but at times morally repugnant. Robert
Cover's Justice Accused14 powerfully portrays the morally disturbing choic-
es made by many judges in slavery cases, based on a narrow view of which
considerations are a part of "the law."' 5 Cover notes that in an exemplary
decision, Justice John McLean wrote: "It is argued that slavery had its ori-
gin in usurpation and injustice, and is continued in violation of man, as
declared in our Declaration of Independence; but these are topics which this
court will not discuss. We look to the law, and only to the law."' 6 If judges
refuse to include in their view of "the law" the continuing injustice of social
institutions, it is unlikely that they will be able to produce the type of "bet-
ter law" that Sunstein advocates.
The list of unfortunate judicial decisions that have resulted from a lack
of perspective may begin with the slavery cases. Arguably, "[o]pinions
steeped in what we see as serious moral error" have continued at the rate of
"at least one per generation."' 7 Scholars have compiled a compelling list of
cases, dating from 1856 to 1986, in which judicial opinions showed a lack
of appreciation for the perspectives of various groups, including slaves,
Native Americans, Chinese immigrants, Japanese Americans, women, men-
tally ill individuals, and homosexuals. 8 A supplemented list might well
include religious minorities.
This history suggests that in cases relating to the interests of minorities
and oppressed groups, judges are not neutral arbiters who decide the law
based purely upon objective reason. It is disturbing, but not surprising, that
judges who fail to consider the perspectives of disadvantaged groups may
also fail to interpret the law in a way that will help combat some of
society's institutional biases. Indeed, judges who erroneously believe that
they present neutral interpretations of the law are particularly likely to have
that belief if they are unaware of, or unwilling to acknowledge, the experi-
ences of those whose perspectives are ignored. 9
man, after all. He is not the whole community. No one man or woman could be
that.
Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Gov-
ernment, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 76 (1986).
14 ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PRO-
CESS (1975).
15 Id. at 120.
16 Vaughn v. Williams, 28 F. Cas. 332, 339 (C.C.C. Ohio 1853) (No. 9,583); see
COVER, supra note 14, at 120 (citing Vaughn and other slavery cases).
17 Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Se-
rious Moral Error?, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1929, 1929-30 (1991).
18 See generally id.
19 As Professors Delgado and Stefancic noted in documenting "embarrassingly inhu-
1996]
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Although it is often difficult for judges to incorporate the perspectives of
others into their legal analysis, one case stands out as a model for the use of
perspectives to make better law: Brown v. Board of Education." At the
time of the Brown decision, many scholars contended that the Court's hold-
ing was based not on "the law" but on sociological theory that is alien to
legal principles. Charles Black responded to these contentions in a landmark
article, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions.2 Black's compelling
arguments, which focused on the experiential realities of segregation, suc-
cessfully combatted the question of whether Brown had been decided cor-
rectly, based on "the law."22 Black refused to abide by an unrealistically
narrow definition of what may be properly considered part of "the law."
mane decisions, . . . [o]ne obvious explanation for these mistakes is judicial inability to
identify, imaginatively, with the persons whose fate is being decided. Because of the
particularized stock of life experiences and understandings judges bring to the bench,
these notorious opinions seemed to their authors unexceptionable, natural, 'the truth."'
Id. at 1930 (footnote omitted).
The willingness of judges to issue decisions that affect the lives of those whose
positions they have not fully considered evokes the Talmudic warning: "Do not judge
another until you are in that person's place." Talmud Bavli, Avoth 2:5. While the Tal-
mud obviously recognizes the practical reality that forces judges to decide the cases of
everyone who comes before them, the Talmudic ideal can at least be approached if a
judge learns as much as possible about the perspectives of others.
In an attempt to counteract the troubling judicial decisions that ignore certain per-
spectives, Professor Kimberl6 Crenshaw has tried to "empower students to critique the
texts in their own voices" by learning "how to analyze an opinion that carries the air of
authority but which may nevertheless deny a reality that its readers feel they know."
Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal
Education, 11 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1, 13 (1989). As a result, "the relevance of [students']
perspective[s is] not only affirmed, but given a role in their descriptive or normative
analyses." Id. The students develop "specific arguments ranging from empirically- or
experientially-based critiques of the accuracy of the claims being made, to criticism of
the normative world view implicitly or explicitly adopted by the texts." Finally, the
students acquire "a sense that positions [are] clarified, and that alternative possibilities
[are] seriously debated, rather than presumed or overlooked." Id.
20 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Martha Minow observes that "[s]chool desegregation stands
as the first and perhaps most memorable example of dramatic judicial action that altered
established institutions on behalf of a group long considered different by others in soci-
ety." MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW 356 (1990).
21 Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J.
421 (1960).
22 See, e.g., JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURT 161-62 (1994) ("When
some scholars theorized abstractly about the constitutionality of segregation, arguing
that though it treated blacks and whites separately, it treated them equally, [Charles
Black] responded with a healthy dose of reality. He knew the purposes and effects of
segregation firsthand.").
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Significantly, Professor Black, a caucasian who grew up in the South,
looked through the eyes of the victims of segregation to identify a number
of inequities produced by that system. He eloquently declared his interest in
perspectives to discover legal "evidence of what segregation means to the
people who impose it and to the people who are subjected to it."' 3 Black
argued that "[t]he Court that refused to see inequality in this cutting off [of
blacks from society] would be making the only kind of law that can be
warranted outrageous in advance-law based on self-induced blindness, on
flagrant contradiction of known fact."' Indeed, he found the facts of segre-
gation to be "matters of common notoriety, matters not so much for judicial
notice as for the background knowledge of educated men who live in the
world."' Looking at the actual effects of segregation, based on "the ground
of history and of common knowledge about the facts of life in the times and
places"'26 where it existed, Black concluded that the segregation judgments,
"like all judgments, must rest on the rightness of their law and the truth of
their fact."'27
In perhaps the most powerful passage of his Article, Black relied on
common sense to answer the question, "[D]oes segregation offend against
equality?"' After noting that "[e]quality, like all general concepts, has
marginal areas where philosophic difficulties are encountered,"'29 Black
looked to reality and perspective to conclude that there was no philosophic
difficulty in deciding that segregation violated equality:
[I]f a whole race of people finds itself confined within a
system which is set up and continued for the very purpose of
keeping it in an inferior station, and if the question is then
solemnly propounded whether such a race is being treated
"equally," I think we ought to exercise one of the sovereign
prerogatives of philosophers-that of laughter. The only
question remaining (after we get our laughter under control)
is whether the segregation system answers to this description.
Here I must confess to a tendency to start laughing all
over again. I was raised in the South, in a Texas city where
the pattern of segregation was firmly fixed. I am sure it
never occurred to anyone, white or colored, to question its
meaning. The fiction of "equality" is just about on a level
Black, supra note 21, at 426.
24 Id.
2 Id.
26 Id. at 427.
27 Id. at 429.
28 Id. at 424.
29 Id.
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with the fiction of "finding" in the action of trover.3
Just as Professor Black refused to accept a theoretical conceptualization
of law that ignored the reality of the effects of segregation, Professor
Fineman has written that "feminist methodology is about making theory
more concrete, bringing in stories and other ways of identifying and describ-
ing women's experiences as they exist and as they have been left out of the
legal system."'" Similarly, it is important for courts to reject legal analysis
that ignores the reality of the effect of laws on other underrepresented
groups, including religious minorities.
II. RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES
The United States consists of people who represent an almost uncount-
able variety of perspectives. These perspectives may result from numerous
factors, including but not limited to race, gender, ethnicity, sexual orienta-
tion, class, able-bodiedness, and religion. The new legal disciplines and
theories mentioned earlier in this Article aim at recognizing the existence of
many of these perspectives and at understanding the way in which they
relate to and impact the development of law.
Religious perspectives deserve the attention of legal scholars. New reli-
gions are continuously introduced into American society both through the
addition of religions never before practiced in the United States and through
variations on previously established religions. There is little reason to doubt
that this trend will continue.
The continuing increase in religious minorities suggests that more than
ever courts must appreciate religious minority perspectives to ensure that the
law evolves concurrently with our country's changing religious landscape. In
the future, it will be increasingly important for judges and lawyers to have
the capacity to understand the perspectives of religious minorities.
Perhaps the best way to see the legal effects of religious perspectives is
to examine Supreme Court decisions. The United States Supreme Court has
failed to acknowledge fully the rights of several religious minorities whose
practices and attitudes do not conform to those of more established Ameri-
can religions.32 Mari Matsuda notes that "[a]s feminist theorists have point-
ed out, everyone has a gender, but the hidden norm in law is male. As criti-
cal race theorists have pointed out, everyone has a race, but the hidden
norm in law is white."33 Similarly, everyone has a religious viewpoint, but
30 Id.
31 Fineman, supra note 1, at 23 n.51.
32 See infra Parts II.A-B, D-F.
3 Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Juris-
[Vol. 5:1
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the hidden norm in law has been based upon those viewpoints familiar to
American religious sensibilities.34 Because of this norm, the Court has of-
ten failed to produce law that incorporates an understanding of minority reli-
gions."
prudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1361 (1991); see Minow,
supra note 20, at 212 (noting that "feminists challenge the presupposition that there is a
neutral norm against which to judge experience, and the accompanying assumption that
male experience and perceptions conform to that neutral norm").
" Professor Minow writes of similar "[u]nstated points of reference" that "may ex-
press the experience of a majority or may express the perspective of those who have
had greater access to the power used in naming and assessing others." Minow, supra
note 20, at 51. Specifically, she explains that
[w]omen are different in relation to the unstated male norm. Blacks, Mormons,
Jews, and Arabs are different in relation to the unstated white Christian norm.
Handicapped persons are different in relation to the unstated norm of able-
bodiness or, as some have described it, the vantage point of "Temporarily Able
Persons."
Id.
" The importance of a court's understanding the perspectives of minority religions
applies to Establishment Clause cases as well. As Justice O'Connor wrote in response
to Justice Kennedy's criticism of the Court's investigation into the religious meaning of
the Chanukah menorah,
Surely, Justice Kennedy cannot mean that this Court must keep itself in ignorance
of the symbol's conventional use and decide the constitutional question knowing
only what it knew before the case was filed. This prescription of ignorance obvi-
ously would bias this Court according to the religious and cultural backgrounds of
its Members.
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 614 n.60 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in judgment).
Justice O'Connor thus advocated understanding the perspective of an adherent to a
religion whose symbol is placed in public. In a dissenting opinion in the recent case
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995), however,
Justice Stevens focused on the perspective of a non-adherent. Stevens noted the variety
of responses that may accompany a freestanding wooden cross placed by the Ku Klux
Klan in front of Ohio's statehouse: "Some might have perceived it as a message of
love, others as a message of hate, still others as a message of exclusion-a Statehouse
sign calling powerfully to mind their outsider status." Id. at 2457 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). Stressing the importance of religious minority perspective jurisprudence in consid-
eration of the Establishment Clause, Justice Stevens stated:
It is especially important to take into account the perspective of a reasonable
observer who may not share the particular religious belief it expresses. A para-
mount purpose of the Establishment Clause is to protect such a person from being
made to feel like an outsider in matters of faith, and like a stranger in the political
community. If a reasonable person could perceive a government endorsement of
religion from a private display, then the State may not allow its property to be
used as a forum for that display. No less stringent rule can adequately protect
non-adherents from a well-grounded perception that their sovereign supports a
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Dissenting Justices, however, have consistently criticized the Court's
approach, often by expressing the perspective of the minority religion and
by urging that this perspective be accorded the respect given to more estab-
lished religions. These dissenting opinions, which have been particularly
sensitive to religious differences, often serve as models for judges, lawyers,
and scholars. 6
A. Claims of Jehovah's Witnesses
In the early 1940s, the Supreme Court considered a number of cases
relating to the free exercise rights of Jehovah's Witnesses. Two of these
cases, including the landmark case Board of Education v. Barnette,3 7 in-
volved student refusal to participate in a school flag salute ceremony.38
faith to which they do not subscribe.
Id. at 2466 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
For a discussion of the power of religious symbols to exclude outsiders, see gener-
ally Kenneth L. Karst, The First Amendment, the Politics of Religion and the Symbols
of Government, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 503 (1992).
36 This Article does not conclude that in each case examined the Court should have
adopted the legal arguments presented by the religious minority. Rather, this Article
suggests that a careful look at the various opinions often demonstrates the majority's in-
ability or unwillingness to acknowledge realistically the needs of religious minorities.
The failure to understand properly religious minorities' beliefs and practices will to a
certain extent impede the possibility of properly protecting their rights.
Moreover, in some cases, the Court may have indeed considered a religious minori-
ty perspective without so indicating in the text of the opinion. Nevertheless, the Court's
very failure to give adequate expression to religious minority perspectives in written
opinions has the effect of improperly limiting the significance accorded these perspec-
tives in legal thought. In part, this Article attempts to follow the approach of "a number
of legal scholars who have come to reject [the] orthodox view of the relation between
legal discourse and legal doctrine." Kendall Thomas, The Eclipse of Reason: A Rhetori-
cal Reading of Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1805, 1811 (1993). As Kendall
Thomas notes,
Until quite recently, professional students of the Supreme Court have been condi-
tioned to train their interpretive energies on the logic, rather than the language, of
the Court's opinions. In short, they have viewed the rhetoric of the Supreme
Court analysis and argument mainly as a tool for communicating rules of constitu-
tional law, which are taken to be separate and distinct from that rhetoric it-
self .... In its most radical moments, . . . recent writing on the theory and prac-
tice of legal interpretation undermines the idea that the content of legal doctrine is
separable (even in principle) from its discursive form ....
Id.
3' 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
38 West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Minersville
School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
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Although the flag salute cases have an important place in both free exercise
and free speech jurisprudence, the cases dealing with the Witnesses' practic-
es of public proselytizing are particularly illustrative of different approaches
taken by Supreme Court justices towards an unfamiliar religious system.a9
In the 1942 case Jones v. Opelika," a number of Witnesses appealed
their convictions pursuant to various city ordinances that imposed taxes on
the sale of printed matter. Relying in part on a free exercise claim, the ap-
pellants challenged the constitutionality of the ordinances as applied to their
practice of distributing booklets and pamphlets describing their religious
beliefs.4 The majority opinion acknowledged the "distinction between non-
discriminatory regulation of operations which are incidental to the exercise
of religion ... and those which are imposed upon the religious rite it-
self.",42 The Court further recognized that "both teachers and preachers
need to receive support for themselves as well as alms and benefactions for
charity and the spread of knowledge., 43 Nevertheless, the Court upheld the
convictions, concluding that it "view[s] these sales as partaking more of
commercial than religious or educational transactions."44
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Murphy showed a sensitivity to the reli-
gious perspectives of the Witnesses and a concern for the rights of adherents
of unfamiliar and unpopular religions. After analyzing the ordinances under
both free speech and free press principles, Justice Murphy turned to "a right
even more dear to many individuals-the right to worship their Maker ac-
cording to their needs and the dictates of their souls and to carry their mes-
sage or their gospel to every living creature., 45 He thus established a gen-
eral framework recognizing the fundamental constitutional right to freedom
in religious worship and in proselytizing. Next, Justice Murphy placed the
activities of the Witnesses squarely within this framework, describing the
appellants as "itinerant ministers going through the streets and from house
to house in different communities, preaching the gospel. by distributing
booklets and pamphlets setting forth their views of the Bible and the tenets
of their faith."46 Rejecting the majority's categorization of this conduct as
chiefly commercial, Justice Murphy concluded that "[i]t does not appear that
their motives were commercial, but only that they were evangelizing their
9 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
1005 (1943); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942).
40 316 U.S. 584 (1942).
41 Id. at 587.
42 Id. at 596.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 598.
4' Id. at 621 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
46 Id. (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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faith as they saw it."47
Recognizing that the Witnesses' mode of preaching may appear unusual
to those familiar with more popular and established religious systems, Jus-
tice Murphy further developed his argument by observing the underlying
similarities between different religious practices.4" Justice Murphy wrote
that "[w]hile perhaps not so orthodox as the oral sermon, the use of reli-
gious books is an old, recognized and effective mode of worship and means
of proselytizing. For this, petitioners were taxed."49 Having drawn the com-
parison between the Witnesses and more "orthodox" religions, Justice Mur-
phy argued powerfully that "[t]he mind rebels at the thought that a minister
of any of the old established churches could be made to pay fees to the
community before entering the pulpit."5
Finally, Justice Murphy declared the importance of protecting unpopular
religion to be a fundamental value of the United States. Justice Murphy
emphasized that "the protection of the Constitution must be extended to all,
not only to those whose views accord with prevailing thought but also to
dissident minorities."51 Addressing the plight of the Witnesses in particular,
Justice Murphy stated that "[o]ne need only read the decisions of this and
other courts in the past few years to see the unpopularity of Jehovah's Wit-
nesses and the difficulties put in their path because of their religious be-
liefs."52 He noted that "[a]n arresting parallel exists between the troubles of
Jehovah's Witnesses and the struggles of various dissentient groups in the
American colonies for religious liberty."53 Returning to the ordinances, Jus-
tice Murphy concluded that "[1]iberty of conscience is too full'of meaning
for the individuals of this Nation to permit taxation to prohibit or substan-
tially impair the spread of religious ideas, even though they are controversial
and run counter to the established notions of a community.,
54
Less than one year later, in Murdock v. Pennsylvania,55 the Court de-
clared unconstitutional a similar ordinance and vacated Opelika, with Justice
Douglas writing for the majority. This time, the majority opinion carefully
considered the Witnesses' religious practices as viewed through the perspec-
tive of adherents. Justice Reed, who had written the majority opinion in
Opelika, wrote for the dissent in Murdock. Justice Reed again argued that
4I Id. at 612 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
I' d. at 621 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
49 Id. (Murphy, J., dissenting).
SO Id. (Murphy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 611-12 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
52 Id. at 621-22 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 622 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
14 Id. at 623 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
" 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
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the Witnesses' activities could not be considered "religious exercises. 56
Justice Douglas's majority opinion, however, cited passages in the New
Testament that the Witnesses used to support their practices. 57 The majority
noted that according to the Witnesses' own interpretation of the New Testa-
ment, they obeyed a divine command by distributing religious literature.58
Echoing Justice Murphy's dissent in Opelika, which Justice Douglas had
joined, the majority opinion tried to universalize the seemingly unconven-
tional nature of the Witnesses' religious practices. The Court observed that
"[t]he hand distribution of religious tracts is an age-old form of missionary
evangelism-as old as the history of printing presses:"'59 Additionally, the
Court documented the method of distributing religious tracts "in various
religious movements down through the years' 60 and noted that "[t]his form
of evangelism is utilized today on a large scale by various religious
sects.,
61
Justice Douglas also employed another technique that Justice Murphy
had used in the Opelika dissent: drawing explicit comparisons to more fa-
miliar forms of religious practice. Comparing the Witnesses' practices to a
revival meeting, the Court concluded that "[t]his form of religious activity
occupies the same high estate under the First Amendment as do worship in
the churches and preaching from the pulpits. It has the same claim to pro-
tection as the more orthodox and conventional exercises of religion., 62
Finally, the majority showed a sensitivity to the special protections that
must be afforded an unpopular and unfamiliar religious movement such as
the Witnesses. Openly acknowledging the nature of the literature distributed
by the Witnesses, the Court described "its provocative, abusive, and ill-man-
nered character and the assault which it makes on our established churches
and the cherished faiths of many of us. '63 Yet the Court was just as forth-
right in its defense of the religious practices, stating that
those considerations are no justification for the license tax
which the ordinance imposes. Plainly a community may not
suppress, or a state tax, the dissemination of views because
they are unpopular, annoying or distasteful. If that device
were ever sanctioned, there would have been forged a ready
instrument for the suppression of the faith which any minori-
56 Id. at 131 (Reed, J., dissenting).
"' Id. at 108 (quoting Acts 20:20 and Mark 16:15).
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 109.
63 Id. at 115-16.
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ty favors but which does not happen to be in favor. That
would be a complete repudiation of the philosophy of the
Bill of Rights.64
The Witnesses were not as successful a year later when the Court con-
fronted yet "another episode in the conflict between Jehovah's Witnesses
and state authority, 65 in Prince v. Massachusetts.56 The appellants chal-
lenged the constitutionality of child labor laws as applied to the rights of
Witness children to distribute religious literature. The Court found the labor
laws constitutional, deferring to the state's power to effect prohibitions that
it deems "necessary to accomplish its legitimate objectives. 67
With the majority ruling against the Witnesses, Justice Murphy returned
to the role of dissenter, defending the rights of the religious minority. Jus-
tice Murphy again asserted that the activities were religious in nature rather
than commercial. Quoting the majority opinion in Murdock, Justice Murphy
wrote that the child "was occupied, in other words, in 'an age-old form of
missionary evangelism' with a purpose 'as evangelical as the revival meet-
ing. 1;168
Justice Murphy then criticized the majority's deference to the state's
judgment, emphasizing that "[t]he burden ... [was] on the state of Massa-
chusetts to prove the reasonableness and necessity of prohibiting children
from engaging in religious activity of the type involved in this case., 69 Re-
sponding to the majority's reference to "possible harms arising from.., the
diverse influences of the street,"7 Justice Murphy countered that "there is
not the slightest indication in this record, or in sources subject to judicial
notice, that children engaged in distributing literature pursuant to their reli-
gious beliefs have been or are likely to be subject to any" such harms.7'
Justice Murphy found that the fact that the children were engaged in reli-
gious activity indicated that "[t]he dangers are ... exceedingly remote, to
say the least." '72
Justice Murphy concluded his dissenting opinion with an eloquent and
urgent call for protection of the rights of the Witnesses and other religious
minorities:
64 Id. at 116.
65 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 159 (1944).
6 Id.
67 id. at 170.
68 Id. at 172 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (quoting Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105, 108, 109 (1943)).
61 Id. at 173 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 168 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 175 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
72 Id. (Murphy, J., dissenting).
166 [Vol. 5:1
1996] TOWARDS A RELIGIOUS MINORITY 167
From ancient times to the present day, the ingenuity of man
has known no limits in its ability to forge weapons of op-
pression for use against those who dare to express or prac-
tice unorthodox religious beliefs. And the Jehovah's Wit-
nesses are living proof of the fact that even in this na-
tion ... the right to practice religion in unconventional ways
is still far from secure. Theirs is a militant and unpopular
faith, pursued with a fanatical zeal. They have suffered brutal
beatings; their property has been destroyed; they have been
harassed at every turn by the resurrection and enforcement of
little used ordinances and statutes. To them, along with other
present-day religious minorities, befalls the burden of testing
our devotion to the ideals and constitutional guarantees of
religious freedom.73
B. Braunfeld v. Brown: Orthodox Jewish Claims
In 1961, the Court decided Braunfeld v. Brown,74 a case involving the
free exercise rights of Orthodox Jews. The appellants were merchants en-
gaged in the retail sale of clothing and home furnishing." Their religious
beliefs required them to close their businesses on their Sabbath, which lasts
from sundown on Friday until nightfall on Saturday. 6 To recover some of
the resulting lost business, the appellants opened their businesses on Sun-
days.' A Pennsylvania criminal statute, however, proscribed the Sunday
retail sale of a number of commodities, including those sold by the appel-
lants.7' The appellants claimed that the statute would cause them substan-
tial economic loss unless they violated a basic tenet of their faith.79
In rejecting the appellants' claim, the Court stressed the need for a
"weekly respite from all labor."8" The Court likewise rejected the
appellants' request for an exemption from the statute, citing "enforcement
problems" and the potential of "economic advantage" for those granted such
an exemption.8 ' In particular, the Court speculated that an exemption
7 Id. at 175-76 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
4 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
71 Id. at 601.
76 Id.
" Id.
78 Id. at 600.
79 Id. at 602.
80 Id. at 607.
"I Id. at 608.
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
"might cause the Sunday-observers to complain that their religions are being
discriminated against.) 2
While the majority was concerned with the perspective of the majority
of merchants, Justice Brennan's partial focused instead on "the point of
view of the individuals whose liberty is--concededly--curtailed by these
enactments."8'3 Justice Brennan's decision to "approach this case different-
ly'') 4 is an important example of effective religious perspective jurispru-
dence that makes a practical difference in resolving cases. Having crossed
the conceptual boundary that would prevent someone who is an "outsider"
to Orthodox Judaism from understanding such a religious perspective,
Brennan opined that "the issue in this case ... is whether a State may put
an individual to a choice between his business and his religion. The Court
holds that it may. But I dissent, believing that such a law prohibits the free
exercise of religion." 5
Moreover, Justice Brennan rejected the formalistic approach by which
the majority distinguished its holding from those decisions involving laws
that directly prohibited a religious practice. The majority noted that the
Pennsylvania statute did not state that the appellants had to work on Sat-
urday. 6 In a passage reminiscent of Charles Black's approach to the effects
of segregation, 7 Brennan responded to the majority by looking at the situa-
tion through the eyes of an Orthodox Jewish merchant. Justice Brennan
recognized the real effect of the law,
that appellants may not simultaneously practice their religion
and their trade, without being hampered by a substantial
competitive disadvantage ... that no one may at one and the
same time be an Orthodox Jew and compete effectively with
his Sunday-observing fellow tradesmen. This clog upon the
exercise of religion, this state-imposed burden on Orthodox
Judaism, has exactly the same economic effect as a tax lev-
ied upon the sale of religious literature. And yet, such a
tax ... was held invalid. 8
82 Id. at 609.
83 Id. at 610 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85 Id. at 611 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
86 Id. at 612-13 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
87 See supra text accompanying notes 21-30.
88 Id. at 613 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), the Court'used similar techniques of perspective juris-
prudence to reject a formalistic approach. The Court in Lee considered a challenge to a
prayer at a public school graduation. The majority looked at the prayer through the eyes
of a nonbeliever and analyzed the effect of the prayer on the nonbeliever in the context
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Justice Stewart, in a short dissenting opinion, asserted that
Pennsylvania has passed a law which compels an Orthodox
Jew to choose between his religious faith and his economic
survival. That is a cruel choice. It is a choice which I think
no State can constitutionally demand .... I think the impact
of this law upon these appellants grossly violates their con-
stitutional right to the free exercise of their religion. 9
In a remarkable dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas provided a primer
for the ways that a court can use religious perspective jurisprudence to ap-
preciate fully the effect of laws on minority religions.9" First, Justice Doug-
las redefined the issue in the case. Recognizing the majoritarian Christian
perspective that was the essential basis of the laws prohibiting work on
Sundays, he opined that "[t]he question is whether a State can impose crimi-
nal sanctions on those who, unlike the Christian majority that makes up our
society, worship, on a different day or do not share the religious scruples of
the majority."'" Just as clearly, Justice Douglas answered, "I do not see
of a high school graduation. The Court found that "[w]hat to most believers may seem
nothing more than a reasonable request that the nonbeliever respect their religious prac-
tices, in a school context may appear to the nonbeliever or dissenter to be an attempt to
employ the machinery of the State to enforce a religious orthodoxy." Id. at 592. The
Court noted that the peer pressure that would exist on a nonbeliever at a high school
graduation ceremony, "though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compul-
sion." Id. at 593.
The majority based its opinion on a number of sources, including psychological
studies of adolescent behavior, see id. at 593-94, as well as common sense, declaring
that "[e]veryone knows that in our society and in our culture high school graduation is
one of life's most significant occasions." Id. at 595. The majority was unpersuaded by
approaches such as that of Justice Scalia, who criticized the majority's reliance on "so-
cial engineering," "philosophical predilections," and "psychology practiced by amateurs"
and who characterized the majority's approach as going "beyond the realm where judg-
es know what they are doing." Id. at 632i 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The majority
asserted that "[l]aw reaches past formalism," id. at 595, and a legal argument must in-
clude the understanding of reality that can be accomplished through psychological stud-
ies and common sense. Id.
Despite his criticism of the majority's use of perspective jurisprudence, Justice
Scalia responded by looking at the case through the point of view of "the other side,"
which, as he noted, is "not inconsequential." Id. at 645 (Scalia, J., dissenting). As Jus-
tice Scalia reminds us, a sensitivity to the perspective of nonbelievers should not force
us to ignore the perspectives of those who believe in prayer.'
Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 616 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id. at 561-81 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 561 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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how a State can make protesting citizens refrain from doing innocent acts on
Sunday because the doing of those acts offends sentiments of their Christian
neighbors."92
In order to help members of the Christian majority understand the point
of view of minority religions, Justice Douglas used a technique effective in
perspective jurisprudence: he asked members of the majority to place them-
selves in the shoes of members of minority religions. Justice Douglas pre-
sented hypothetical state legislatures, consisting of a majority of Orthodox
Jews, Seventh Day Adventists, or Moslems, which would pass laws
criminalizing opening a shop on their respective sabbaths.93 He asked rhe-
torically whether "the rest of us [would] have to submit under the fear of
criminal sanctions?
94
Justice Douglas then explained the effect of the Sunday laws on an indi-
vidual with a minority religious perspective:
They force minorities to obey the majority's religious feel-
ings of what is due and proper for a Christian community;
they provide a coercive spur to the "weaker brethren," to
those who are indifferent to the claims of a Sabbath through
apathy or scruple. Can there be any doubt that Christians,
now aligned vigorously in favor of these laws, would be as
strongly opposed if they were prosecuted under a Moslem
law that forbade them from engaging in secular activities on
days that violated Moslem scruples?95
Recognizing the concerns of the Orthodox Jewish appellants in particular,
Justice Douglas stated that "[w]hen ... the State uses its coercive pow-
ers ... to compel minorities to observe a second Sabbath, not their own, the
State undertakes to aid and 'prefer one religion over another'--contrary to
the command of the Constitution.,
96
Justice Douglas concluded his opinion through another technique useful
in perspective jurisprudence-extensive citation of narrative. What makes
this narrative so valuable is that unlike narratives in which a person with a
minority perspective expresses feelings of oppression and alienation, Justice
Douglas's narrative reflects the view of someone, like Justice Douglas, who
is part of the majority yet appreciates the minority perspective. The
92 Id. at 562 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 565 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 576 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 577 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Everson v. Board of Ed., 330 U.S. 1,
15 (1947)).
[Vol. 5:1
TOWARDS A RELIGIOUS MINORITY
narrative's speaker is a pastor of a Presbyterian church who speaks of the
religious freedoms that should be available to his Jewish friend and to the
members of a local Seventh Day Adventist church who close their business-
es on Saturday.97 The pastor concluded: "Why should my faith be favored
by the State over any other man's faith?"" Justice Douglas shared the
pastor's sensitivity and concluded that "none of the opinions filed today in
support of the Sunday laws has answered that question."99
C. Wisconsin v. Yoder: Amish Claims
In 1972, the Court decided Wisconsin v. Yoder,"° which involved a
free exercise claim by members of the Old Order Amish religion and the
Conservative Amish Mennonite Church. Notably, the Court was sympathetic
to the Amish and accepted the claim that their faith and way of life were
inseparable and interdependent.''
Particularly interesting is the manner in which the Court demonstrated
that the Amish way of life represents a comprehensive religious system. The
Court twice compared Amish practices to Jewish religious practices. First,
the Court described the Amish practice of adult baptism, "at which Amish
young people voluntarily undertake heavy obligations, not unlike the Bar
Mitzvah of the Jews, to abide by the rules of the church community."10 2
Second, the Court made reference to the Amish religion's "Talmudic di-
et." 103
Regardless of the accuracy of the comparisons," it is noteworthy that
by 1973, Jewish religious practice had apparently become so familiar that
the Court used it as a basis of comparison to illustrate the religious nature
of the Amish system. More generally, the Court showed a willingness to en-
gage in a technique useful for perspective jurisprudence: the Court carefully
looked to the familiar in an attempt to understand the perspective of the
unfamiliar. Indeed, the precise nature of the comparison is not as important
as the fact that the comparison allows a means for recognizing a minority
perspective. More striking, and perhaps more satisfying, is the Court's ap-
parent comfort with Judaism, a minority religion. This comfort enabled the
97 Id.
98 Id. at 561, 581 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
99 Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
100 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
1'0 Id. at 216.
102 Id. at 210.
103 Id. at 216.
" It is not fully accurate to say that at a bar mitzvah an individual voluntarily un-
dertakes the obligations of the Jewish community. Additionally, the Amish diet is not
regulated by the Talmud.
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Court to use Judaism as a religious point of reference. Finally, as a result of
the Court's successful appreciation of the Amish religion in Yoder, when a
free exercise claim based on Amish belief arose in 1982 in United States v.
Lee,"°5 the Court accepted the validity of the religious belief without ex-
tensive inquiry."
D. Goldman v. Weinberger: Orthodox Jewish Claims Revisited
In light of the Court's apparent view in Yoder of Judaism as a familiar
religion and of the Court's sensitivity to the Amish religion, one might
expect that the Court's appreciation of the Orthodox Jewish perspective had
increased since its 1961 decision in Braunfeld v. Brown. °7 Given such op-
timistic expectations, the Court's approach in the 1986 case Goldman v.
Weinberger 8 is highly disappointing. Goldman is another example of the
Court's failure to acknowledge fully the significance of a religious practice
as understood from the perspective of an adherent.
Goldman, an Orthodox Jewish clinical psychologist, challenged Air
Force regulations that prohibited him from wearing a yarmulke, as required
by his religion."M In rejecting Goldman's claim, the brief majority opinion
focused almost exclusively on the "considered professional judgment" of Air
Force officials who claimed that allowing Goldman to wear a yarmulke
would undermine the "sense of hierarchical unity" encouraged by uni-
forms."' The Court ignored the effect that compliance with the regulations
would have on Goldman's religious life, calling it merely "objection-
able.' The majority opinion prompted a number of dissents, and Justice
Brennan, writing twenty-five years after Braunfeld, again eloquently rose to
the defense of the free exercise rights of Orthodox Jews.1
One important aspect of Justice Brennan's extensive dissenting opinion
105 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
106 In Lee, pursuant to religious beliefs, a member of the Old Order Amish failed to
comply with social security laws. Id. at 254-55. The nearly unanimous majority opinion
stated unequivocally that "[b]ecause the payment of the taxes or receipt of benefits vio-
lates Amish religious beliefs, compulsory participation in the social security system in-
terferes with their free exercise rights." Id. at 257. Justice Stevens's concurring opinion
likewise acknowledged an "irreconcilable ... clash between appellee's religious obliga-
tion and his civic obligation." Id. at 261 (Stevens, J., concurring).
107 366 U.S. 599 (1961); see supra Part lI.B.
' 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
109 Id. at 506.
11o Id. at 508.
I' d. at 509.
112 Id. at 513 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 610-16 (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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is his recognition of the Orthodox Jewish perspective and specifically
Goldman's perspective regarding the military regulation. In contrast to the
absence of a single reference in the majority opinion to the religious signifi-
cance of a yarmulke, the first line of Justice Brennan's opinion acknowledg-
es that "Simcha Goldman invokes this Court's protection 'of his First
Amendment right to fulfill one of the traditional religious obligations of a
male Orthodox Jew-to cover his head before an omnipresent God.
11 3
Justice Brennan was unconvinced when the majority
attempt[ed], unsuccessfully to minimize the burden that was
placed on Dr. Goldman's rights. The fact that "the regula-
tions do not permit the wearing of... a yarmulke," does not
simply render military life for observant Orthodox Jews
"objectionable." It sets up an almost absolute bar to the ful-
fillment of a religious duty. Dr. Goldman spent most of his
time in uniform indoors, where the dress code forbade him
even to cover his head with his service cap. Consequently,
113 Id. at 513 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan's dissenting opinion, followed Justice
Stevens's concurring opinion which, although ultimately favoring the upholding of the
military regulation, explained that "[i]n addition to its religious significance for the
wearer, the yarmulke may evoke the deepest respect and admiration-the symbol of a
distinguished tradition and an eloquent rebuke to the ugliness of anti-Semitism." Id. at
510-11 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
A dichotomy similar to that in Goldman existed between the approaches of the
majority and dissenting opinions in the recent case Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of
Va., 115 S.Ct. 2510 (1995). The Court held that the University of Virginia would not
violate the Establishment Clause by providing funds for a student-run Christian publica-
tion. The dissent argued that it was necessary to take "a closer look at [the publication]
than the majority opinion affords." Id. at 2534 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissent cited
the publication extensively, revealing that it often contained "nothing other than the
preaching of the word, which ... is what most branches of Christianity offer those
called to the religious life." Id. at 2535 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissent decried the
majority's "fail[ure] to confront the evidence," which resulted in the majority
"referr[ing] uninformatively to [the publication's] 'Christian viewpoint' or its 'religious
perspective."' Id. at 2540 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
The dissent concluded that through its failure to acknowledge the actual contents of
the magazine, the majority denied an obvious reality:
The Court does not quote the magazine's adoption of Saint Paul's exhortation to
awaken to the nearness of salvation, or any of its articles enjoining readers to
accept Jesus, . . . or the religious verses, or the religious textual analyses, or the
suggested prayers. And so it is easy for the Court to lose sight of what the Uni-
versity students and the Court of Appeals found so obvious, and to blanch the
patently and frankly evangelistic character of the magazine by unrevealing allu-
sions to religious points of view.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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he was asked to violate the tenets of his faith virtually every
minute of every workday." 4
Continuing his appreciation for the perspective of Orthodox Jews in the
military, Justice Brennan observed that "[t]he Court and military services
have presented patriotic Orthodox Jews with a painful dilemma-the choice
between fulfilling a religious obligation and serving their country. Should
the draft be reinstated, compulsion will replace choice .... [T]he pain the
services inflict on Orthodox Jewish servicemen... is unworthy of our mili-
tary.""15
Justice Brennan was even more stinging in. his criticism of the
majority's "absolute, uncritical 'deference to the professional judgment of
military authorities.""' 6 Justice Brennan argued that under the majority's
approach, if military officials conclude that regulations are important enough
to outweigh constitutional rights, "the Court will accept that conclusion, no
matter how absurd or unsupported it may be.""..7 Even a deferential stan-
dard of review, Justice Brennan explained, "need not, and should not, mean
that the Court must credit arguments that defy common sense."" 8 Justice
Brennan's call for common sense on the part of the Court once again is
reminiscent of Charles Black's argument that legal consideration of the
desegregation cases required that they be viewed through the lens of com-
mon sense and reality, rather than through abstract theory." 9
In his analysis of the Air Force's assertion that its interests in discipline
and uniformity would be undermined by allowing Orthodox Jewish males to
wear yarmulkes, Justice Brennan skillfully and forcefully showed that the
military's argument indeed defied common sense. Justice Brennan stated
categorically that "[t]he contention that the discipline of the Armed Forces
will be subverted if Orthodox Jews are allowed to wear yarmulkes with their
uniforms surpasses belief."'20 Moreover, Brennan declared, "It cannot be
seriously contended that a serviceman in a yarmulke presents so extreme, so
unusual, or so faddish an image that public confidence in his ability to per-
form his duties will be destroyed."'' Justice Brennan found that "it is the
lack of any reasoned basis for prohibiting yarmulkes that is so striking
114 Goldman, 475 U.S. at 514 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
I15 d. at 524 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 515 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion at 509).
1I7 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
118 Id. at 516 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
9 See supra text accompanying notes 21-30 (discussing Black); supra text accompa-
nying notes 87-88 (noting that Justice Brennan's Braunfeld opinion is reminiscent of
Black's argument).
120 Goldman, 475 U.S. at 517 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
121 Id. at 518 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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With a careful eye on reality, Brennan noted that the yarmulke worn by
Goldman was "a dark-colored skullcap measuring approximately 5 inches
in diameter."'"2 As a result of a realistic understanding of the religious and
symbolic significance of the yarmulke, Justice Brennan further found
totally implausible the suggestion that the overarching group
identity of the Air Force would be threatened if Orthodox
Jews were allowed to wear yarmulkes with their uniforms.
To the contrary, a yarmulke worn with a United States mili-
tary uniform is an eloquent reminder that the shared and
proud identity of United States servicemen embraces and
unites religious and ethnic pluralism.'24
In short, Justice Brennan concluded, "The Air Force has failed utterly to
furnish a credible explanation why an exception to the dress code permitting
Orthodox Jews to wear neat and conservative yarmulkes while in uniform is
likely to interfere with its interest in discipline and uniformity."'"2 Indeed,
Justice Brennan's passionate and outspoken demand for a realistic perspec-
tive reminds one of Charles Black's argument that the most natural response
to a court's refusal to acknowledge reality may be laughter.2 6 Although
laughter regarding the Goldman decision may not be as strong as that re-
garding the segregationist contentions that Black addressed,2 7 in Justice
Brennan's words, the argument propounded by the military and accepted by
the Court "surpasses belief," "cannot be seriously contended," has no "credi-
ble explanation," and "lack[s] any reasoned basis."'2
122 Id. at 520 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
123 Id. at 514 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 519 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 522 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
126 See supra text accompanying note 30. This is not the first time that Goldman has
been compared to Plessy v. Ferguson in terms of the Court's inability to acknowledge
reality. See Michelman, supra note 13, at 31 ("Goldman v. Weinberger suggests [the
discriminatory potential of determinedly abstract law]. So too does Plessy v. Ferguson:
only in sedulous abstraction from concrete experience could 'separate' have seemed
'equal."') (citations omitted).
127 See supra text accompanying note 21.
12S Goldman, 475 U.S. at 516, 519 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun like-
wise found that "the Air Force has failed to produce even a minimally credible explana-
tion for its refusal to allow Goldman to keep his head covered indoors." Id. at 526
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens found that "Captain Goldman's military du-
ties are performed in a setting in which a modest departure from the uniform regulation
creates almost no danger of impairment of the Air Force's military mission." Id. at 511
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Significantly, Justice Brennan also acknowledged the danger that a for-
mally neutral law, enacted from the perspective of a religious majority, will
often lack substantive neutrality because it fails to recognize the perspective
of religious minorities. In a statement that epitomizes successful legal utili-
zation of religious minority perspective jurisprudence, Justice Brennan de-
clared:
Definitions of necessity are influenced by decisionmakers'
experiences and values. As a consequence, in pluralistic
societies such as ours, institutions dominated by a majority
are inevitably, if inadvertently, insensitive to the needs and
values of minorities when these needs and values differ from
those of the majority .... A critical function of the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment is to protect the rights of
members of minority religions against quiet erosion by
majoritarian social institutions that dismiss minority beliefs
and practices as unimportant, because unfamiliar. It is the
constitutional role of this Court to ensure that this purpose of
the First Amendment be realized.'29
E. O'Lone v. Shabazz: Muslim Claims
Two years after Goldman, the Court again showed great deference to the
judgment of a government agency confronted with a free exercise claim. In
O'Lone v. Shabazz,30 Islamic prison inmates challenged restrictions on
their right to attend Jumu'ah, a weekly congregational service.' In deny-
ing the inmates' claims, the Court noted that the "evaluation of penological
objectives is committed to the considered judgment of prison administra-
tors."
132
Dissenting, Justice Brennan again asserted the rights of a religious mi-
(Stevens, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor wrote that Goldman represented one of the
"rare instances where the military has not consistently or plausibly justified its asserted
need for rigidity of enforcement, and where the individual seeking the exemption estab-
lishes that the assertion by the military of a threat to discipline or esprit de corps is in
his or her case completely unfounded." Id. at 532 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
129 Id. at 523-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun was further concerned
that even "allow[ing] noncombat military personnel to wear yarmulkes but not turbans
or dreadlocks because the latter seemed more obtrusive ... would be to discriminate in
favor of this country's more established, mainstream religions, the practices [of] which
are more familiar to the average observer." Id. at 526-27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
130 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
131 Id. at 345.
132 Id. at 349.
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nority. Brennan questioned the wisdom of deferring to the judgment of
prison administrators absent "at least minimal substantiation by prison offi-
cials that alternatives [permitting] participation in Jumu'ah are infeasi-
ble."' 33 Similar to his call in Goldman for a realistic showing that yarmul-
kes would cause a security risk, Justice Brennan argued that "we must de-
mand at least some evidence beyond mere assertion that the religious prac-
tice at issue cannot be accommodated."'1'
Justice Brennan again uncovered the majority's unwillingness, or inabili-
ty, to understand properly the nature of an unfamiliar religious practice.
Brennan cited the majority's view that although there were no alternative
means of attending Jumu'ah, the prison restriction did not work a total de-
privation of the inmates' rights because the inmates could participate in
other religious activities. 135 Refusing to view Jumu'ah "as one of several
essentially fungible religious practices,"'36 Justice Brennan looked at the
deprivation from the perspective of Muslim inmates, who were "completely
foreclosed from participating in the core ceremony that reflects their mem-
bership in a particular religious community.' 37
To illustrate this point, Justice Brennan again referred to similar practic-
es of familiar religions. He noted the district court's finding that "Jumu'ah
is the central religious ceremony of Muslims, 'comparable to the Saturday
service of the Jewish faith and the Sunday service of the various Christian
sects."" 3 Finally, in an effort to help others understand the deprivation
felt by the Muslim inmates, Justice Brennan employed a powerful compari-
son to Catholic practice:
If a Catholic prisoner were prevented from attending Mass
on Sunday, few would regard that deprivation as anything
but absolute, even if the prisoner were afforded other oppor-
tunities to pray, to discuss the Catholic faith with others, and
even to avoid eating meat on Friday if that were a prefer-
ence.
39
Viewed in a similar light, the Muslim inmates' claim of total deprivation of
their religious rights is more fully appreciated.
133 Id. at 363 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
134 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'35 Id. at 359-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
136 Id. at 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
I3 d. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
138 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Shabazz v. O'Lone, 595 F. Supp. 928, 930
(D.N.J. 1984), vacated, 782 F.2d 416 (3d. Cir. 1986), rev'd, 482 U.S. 342 (1987)).
139 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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F. Native American Claims
Unfortunately, like Orthodox Jews and Muslims, Native Americans have
not been as successful as the Amish in having the Court understand their
unique religious perspective. In 1988, in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n, 4 ° Native Americans claimed that government construc-
tion of a road through a portion of a national forest that had traditionally
been used for Indian religious practices would work an impermissible bur-
den on their free exercise rights. The Native Americans argued that the
nature of the burden on their religious practice distinguished their claim
from that of the Native Americans whose claim the Court had denied in a
prior case."' In that case, Bowen v. Roy,' the Court held that a federal
statute requiring the claimants to obtain a social security number for their
daughter in order to receive welfare benefits did not violate the Free Exer-
cise Clause.' In Lyng, the Court refused to analyze the adverse effects of
different laws on different religious practices, rejecting the argument that the
claim was distinguishable from that in Roy.' In an outright refusal to en-
gage in perspective jurisprudence, the majority stated that it was unwilling
to "measur[e] the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's
spiritual development.'
45
Once again, Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion urging the protec-
tion of the free exercise rights of religious minorities. He characterized the
majority opinion as "refus[ing] even to acknowledge the constitutional injury
respondents will suffer."'' 46 This refusal, Justice Brennan wrote, "essential-
ly leaves Native Americans with absolutely no constitutional protection
against perhaps the gravest threat to their religious practices.' ' 47
Justice Brennan attempted to explain the perspective of the members of
the Indian religion.4 8 His discussion included an extensive description of
the Native American belief system. 49 For example, Brennan stressed that
"[i]n marked contrast to traditional western religions, the belief systems of
Native Americans do not rely on doctrines, creeds or dogmas. Established or
universal truths-the mainstay of western religions-play no part in Indian
14o 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
141 Id. at 449 (discussing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986)).
1 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
143 Roy, 476 U.S. at 695.
144 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449-51.
141 Id. at 451.
146 Id. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
141 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 459-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
149 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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faith."'5° He further explained that "[w]here dogma lies at the heart of
western religions, Native American faith is inextricably bound to the use of
the land."'' Although there may be no simple hypothetical to assist mem-
bers of "traditional western religions" in picturing themselves in the Native
Americans' place, Justice Brennan's explanations help portray the unique
Native American perspective.
As he had done in Braunfeld, Justice Brennan rejected the majority view
that "the form of the government's restraint on religious practice, rather than
its effect, controls our constitutional analysis."'' Brennan looked instead
at the practical and realistic interests involved, writing that "today's ruling
sacrifices a religion at least as old as the Nation itself, along with the spiri-
tual well-being of its approximately 5,000 adherents, so that the Forest Ser-
vice can build a 6-mile segment of road that two lower courts found had
only the most marginal and speculative utility.' ' "5
Two years later in Employment Division v. Smith,' Native Americans
again failed to receive adequate protection for their religious practices. In
Smith, the Court held that an Oregon statute that prohibited peyote use did
not violate the free exercise rights of Native Americans.115 The Court rea-
soned that the law did not target Indian religious practice but was merely "a
neutral, generally applicable regulatory law" that had an indirect effect of
burdening the'religious free exercise of Native Americans.'56 The majority
conceded that Native Americans suffered specifically because of their mi-
nority status, and it acknowledged that the Court's decision "will place at a
relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged
in."' 57 The majority called this result "an unavoidable consequence of
democratic government.' 15
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor stressed that
the First Amendment was enacted precisely to protect the
rights of those whose religious practices are not shared by
the majority and may be viewed with hostility. The history
of our free exercise doctrine amply demonstrates the harsh
impact majoritarian rule has had on unpopular or emerging
151 Id. at 460 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
151 Id. at 460-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
152 Id. at 467 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
153 Id. at 476 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
54 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
155 Id. at 880.
156 Id.
157 id. at 890.
158 Id.
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religious groups such as the ... Amish.'59
Justice O'Connor's reliance on the Amish is a noteworthy example of recent
progress in religious perspective jurisprudence. Whereas the Court in Yoder
had understood the Amish religious perspective through comparison to Juda-
ism, eighteen years later Justice O'Connor used the Amish religion as a
basis of comparison for the religious rights of Native Americans.
Justice O'Connor also focused on the particular perspective of Native
Americans, who were faced with "choos[ing] between carrying out the ritual
embodying their religious beliefs and avoidance of criminal prosecu-
tion."' 60 Justice O'Connor rejected the majority's formalistic approach,
stating that "the essence of a free exercise claim is relief from a burden im-
posed by government on religious practices or beliefs, whether the burden is
imposed directly ... or indirectly."'61
In his dissenting opinion Justice Blackmun also made comparisons to
familiar religious systems in order to illustrate the perspective of Native
Americans. In addition to analogizing the Native Americans' claims to the
Amish claims in Yoder,'62 Justice Blackmun drew an analogy to an even
more familiar religious system: Roman Catholicism. Noting that during
Prohibition the federal government exempted the sacramental use of wine by
the Roman Catholic Church, Justice Blackmun opined that "[h]owever com-
pelling the Government's then general interest in prohibiting the use of
alcohol may have been, it could not plausibly have asserted an interest suffi-
ciently compelling to outweigh Catholics' right to take communion.'
63
Justice Blackmun's analogy attempted to prompt members of other faiths to
better appreciate Native American practices." 4
159 Id. at 902 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
160 Id. at 904 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
161 Id. at 897 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
162 Id. at 914 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
163 Id. at 913 n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1" Justice Souter's concurring opinion in Lee v. Weisman is another example of the
effective use of religious minority perspective jurisprudence to recognize the religious
interests of Native Americans. Justice Souter showed a familiarity with, and apprecia-
tion for, many minority religions:
A Christian inviting an Orthodox Jew to lunch might take pains to choose a ko-
sher restaurant; an atheist in a hurry might yield the right of way to an Amish
man steering a horse-drawn carriage. In so acting, we express a respect for ...
the fundamental values of others .... By definition, secular rules of general
application are drawn from the nonadherent's vantage and, consequently, fail to
take [the adherent's] practices into account. Yet when enforcement of such rules
cuts across religious sensibilities, as it often does, it puts those affected to the
choice of taking sides between God and government. In such circumstances, ac-
commodating religion reveals nothing beyond a recognition that general rules can
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Justice Blackmun found the Oregon statute disturbing and noted that
"Oregon's attitude towards respondents' religious peyote use harkens back
to the repressive federal practices pursued a century ago."' 65 He cited offi-
cial government documents from the early part of this century that contained
crude depictions of Indian life, including negative references to Indian mo-
rality and health practices. 166 In light of the historical treatment of Native
Americans, Justice Blackmun's insistence that "this Court must scrupulously
apply its free exercise analysis to the religious claims of Native Americans,
however unorthodox they may be," 167 is a compelling call to improve the
law through perspective jurisprudence.
G. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah: Santeria
Claims
Perhaps partially as a result of the increasing sensitivity of some Justices
to religious minority perspectives, in 1993, the Court unanimously agreed to
protect the rights of adherents to the Santeria religion to practice animal
sacrifice. In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,168
members of the Santeria faith challenged a city ordinance that prohibited
them from engaging in the religious practice of animal sacrifice. 6 9 The
Court sympathetically noted the unfamiliar character of the Sant6ria
religion.'7
The Court used numerous methods to illustrate the religious perspective
of members of the Sant6ria faith. In particular, in its discussion of the
Sant6ria religion, the Court compared many of the practices to those of
more familiar religions. The majority explained that Sant6ria's origins in-
cluded "significant elements of Roman Catholicism" and some practitioners
"express their devotion.., through the iconography of Catholic saints,
Catholic symbols are often present at Sant6ria rites, and Sant6ria devotees
unnecessarily offend the religious conscience when they offend the conscience of
secular society not at all. Thus, in freeing the Native American Church from fed-
eral laws forbidding peyote use ... the government ... simply respects the cen-
trality of peyote to the lives of certain Americans.
505 U.S. 577, 628-29 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
16 Smith, 494 U.S. at 920 n.10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
166 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
167 Id. at 921 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
166 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
169 Id. at 527.
1"0 Id. at 524 (noting that "adherents faced widespread persecution in Cuba, so the re-
ligion and its rituals were practiced in secret. The open practice of Sant6ria and its rites
remains infrequent.").
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attend the Catholic sacraments.' 171
More significantly for the members' free exercise claims, the Court
made accessible the decidedly unfamiliar ritual of animal sacrifice. First, the
majority explained some of Sant6ria's central theological teachings that
motivated animal sacrifice.' The Court then compared Sant6ria to Juda-
ism and Islam, which the Court now considered to be more familiar reli-
gions. The Court noted that "[a]nimal sacrifice ... played an important role
in the practice of Judaism before destruction of the second Temple in Jeru-
salem" and "[i]n modern Islam there is an annual sacrifice."'7 Having
supplied a religious perspective, the Court continued its technical analysis of
the constitutional issues in the case.
The Court's legal analysis showed a refreshing willingness to look be-
yond formal guidelines to the actual effect of the challenged law. The ma-
jority rejected the city's claim that the law should be declared valid based
on the text of the ordinance. 74 In contrast to the majority's emphasis on
formal neutrality in Smith, the Court in Lukumi Babalu Aye noted that
"[f]acial neutrality is not determinative ... [because t]he Free Exercise
Clause protects against governmental hostility which is masked, as well as
overt. ' " The Court carefully analyzed the circumstances of the law's en-
actment, and by utilizing the practical realization that "the effect of a law in
its real operation is strong evidence of its object,"'76 the Court concluded
that the laws were designed "to target petitioners and their religious practic-
es.'
177
In his concurrence, Justice Souter extended the Court's approach another
step. He criticized the very use of the principle of "neutrality" articulated in
Smith, arguing that it "plainly assumes that free-exercise neutrality is of the
formal sort.' 7 Instead, Justice Souter advocated the use of "substantive
neutrality.' 7'  Echoing Justice Brennan's dissent in Goldman,8' Souter
observed that the very notion of formal neutrality betrays a bias towards a
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 524-25.
'74 Id. at 533-34.
175 Id. at 534.
176 Id. at 535. The Court's analysis echoes the question Charles Black asked rhetori-
cally after considering the "very clear character" of the inequities caused by segrega-
tion: "Can a system which, in all that can be measured, has practiced the grossest in-
equality, actually have been 'equal' in intent, in total social meaning and impact?"
Black, supra note 21, at 426.
177 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 534.
178 Id. at 562 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
18o See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 513-24 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); supra text accompanying note 128.
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majoritarian perspective. Souter wrote that "'[n]eutral, generally applicable'
laws, drafted as they are from the perspective of the non-adherent, have the
unavoidable potential of putting the believer to a choice between God and
government..... Finally, indicating his sensitivity to the Sant6ria perspec-
tive, Souter employed the analogy that Justice Blackmun had used in Smith
regarding a secular, generally applicable law prohibiting alcohol consump-
tion. Souter noted that such a law would disproportionately burden the prac-
tice of Catholicism or Judaism and, absent an exemption for sacramental
wine, could be unconstitutional."8 2 Similarly, the Sant~ria religion deserves
protection equal to that granted to Catholicism or Judaism.
CONCLUSION
In his brilliant dissenting opinion in McGowan v. Maryland, Justice
Douglas erroneously predicted that "'[flor the foreseeable future, it seems,
the United States is going to be a three-religion nation [of the Protestant,
Catholic and Jewish religions].'"" 3 Since McGowan, Supreme Court deci-
sions have involved numerous religions and have included cases of impor-
tant free exercise claims made by the Amish, Muslims, Native Americans,
and Santeros. Additionally, the Court has considered the claims of Orthodox
Jews that have not fit Justice Douglas's characterization of the "flavorless[]"
practice of Judaism, which is resigned to a focus on "suburban
togetherness."'"
Unfortunately, although Justice Douglas erred in his prediction of the
religious makeup of the United States and the free exercise claims that
would emerge, the Supreme Court has not completely overcome the attitude
that the prediction seems to have captured. Justice Douglas and the other
dissenters have emphasized the danger to the free exercise of minority reli-
gions that could result from the failure to appreciate religious minority per-
spectives. This danger is evident in the Court's failure to appreciate the
religious burden placed on the Orthodox Jewish businessman whom the
State proscribes from working on Sunday, the Court's ignoring of the im-
pact on Native American religious worship due to government destruction of
sacred Indian land and its prohibition on peyote use, and the Court's ap-
proval of a regulation that prevented Muslim inmates from attending
Jumu'ah. Moreover, in considering the wearing of yarmulkes by servicemen,
the Court ignored not only the Orthodox Jewish perspective but also com-
"' Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 577 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
182 Id. at 561 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
183 366 U.S. 420, 565 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
184 Id. at 566 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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mon sense.
The dissenters in these cases demonstrated that the Court's rejection of
the free exercise claims at issue resulted in large part from an overly formal-
istic view of the law. That view has prevented the Court from appreciating
the practical effect of certain laws on those whose religious rights have been
curtailed. Yet even the majority of the Court occasionally has recognized a
religious minority perspective. The Court's attitude towards the Sant6ria
faith, in particular, represents progress toward improving the law through
incorporation of religious minority perspectives. It remains to be seen, how-
ever, whether the Court will continue to utilize and expand the type of reli-
gious minority perspective jurisprudence that is vital to ensuring protection
of the free exercise rights of all religious minorities.
Legal scholars face a similar challenge. Although scholars have demon-
strated the importance of considering diverse perspectives in analyzing the
development and effects of the law, they have not focused on the perspec-
tives of religious minorities. Hopefully, both the Court and legal scholars
will progress in their appreciation of religious minority perspectives, thereby
allowing the development of a free exercise jurisprudence that embraces the
claims of all religious adherents.
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